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This paper oﬀers the ﬁrst formal economic analysis of carve-outs under airline antitrust im-
munity. Carve-outs are designed to limit the potential anticompetitive eﬀects of cooperation
by alliance partners in hub-to-hub markets, where they provide overlapping nonstop service.
While the paper shows that carve-outs are beneﬁcial when the alliance does not involve full
integration of the partners’ operations on the hub-to-hub route, its key point is that a carve-
out may be harmful when imposed on a joint-venture alliance. A JV alliance involves full
exploitation of economies of traﬃc density on the hub-to-hub route, and a carve-out prevents
the realization of these beneﬁts. While a carve-out may limit anticompetitive incentives on
the hub-to-hub route, welfare may be reduced if the resulting gains are overshadowed by the
eﬃciency loss generated by the carve-out.Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Stef Proost*
1. Introduction
Prohibitions on cross-border airline mergers preclude full integration of US and foreign car-
riers. But international alliances facilitate substantial cooperation between airlines, especially
when the alliance partners enjoy antitrust immunity (ATI). Immunity for an alliance allows
collaboration in the provision of international service in two principal types of markets. One
market type involves travel between smaller US and foreign cities, which requires an “interline”
trip that crosses the networks of the two alliance partners. The other market type involves
nonstop travel between the partners’ (larger) hub cities, where overlapping service allows the
trip to be made using either the US airline or its partner. Immunity has often been granted in
conjunction with an open-skies agreement between the US and the home country of a partner
airline.
The eﬀects of alliances and ATI on airfares have been extensively investigated in the
economics literature. Theory predicts that, for interline trips, cooperation in fare setting
under ATI eliminates a type of horizontal double marginalization. Instead of non-cooperatively
setting the components of an interline fare for travel across two networks, the two carriers
under ATI jointly set the entire fare, reducing their two separate “markups” to one. The
result is a lower interline fare, which beneﬁts passengers. By contrast, in allowing cooperation
on overlapping nonstop hub-to-hub routes, ATI introduces a potential anticompetitive eﬀect.
Cooperating carriers may have an incentive to raise fares for origin-destination passengers
on these routes, restricting the number of hub-to-hub tickets sold and boosting the carriers’
combined proﬁts. This eﬀect may emerge even while interline traﬃc using the hub-to-hub
route rises.
Brueckner (2001) provides a theoretical analysis of both eﬀects, showing that, while the net
1welfare impact on consumers is generally ambiguous, the beneﬁcial impact in interline markets
is likely to oﬀset the potential negative eﬀect in nonstop markets, making the overall eﬀect of
ATI positive. This outcome is especially likely when the hub-to-hub market is small relative
to the full set of interline markets, involving relatively few origin-destination passengers.
Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2003), Whalen (2007), and Willig, Israel and
Keating (2009) provide empirical evidence on the size of the interline fare discount from coop-
erative pricing, which may be as large as 25%. Brueckner and Whalen (2000) and Willig et al.
(2009) also show that the fare impact of alliance cooperation on hub-to-hub routes is eﬀectively
zero, contrary to expectations. A growing set of additional papers further explores economic
issues related to airline alliances.1 Similar tradeoﬀs involving horizontal (as well as vertical)
integration, economies of scale, and anticompetitive behavior emerge in other transportation
contexts (freight, high-speed rail), as shown by De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2007) and
De Borger, Proost and Van Dender (2008).
Despite the absence of a measured fare impact on hub-to-hub routes, concerns about poten-
tial anticompetitive eﬀects persist. In response, regulators have occasionally imposed “carve-
outs” in such markets when granting ATI. A carve-out prohibits collaboration in hub-to-hub
fare setting, while allowing cooperation in other markets. For example, in granting immunity to
United and Lufthansa (founding partners of the Star alliance), the US Department of Trans-
portation imposed carve-outs in the Chicago-Frankfurt and Washington (Dulles)-Frankfurt
markets, which connect United and Lufthansa hubs, while allowing the carriers to set fares
cooperatively elsewhere. By contrast, in its early grant of ATI to Northwest and KLM, carve-
outs were not imposed in their hub-to-hub markets (Detroit-Amsterdam and Minneapolis-
Amsterdam), mainly based on the small size of these markets. Similarly, carve-outs were not
imposed in any of the markets connecting the hubs of Delta and Air France, founding members
of the SkyTeam alliance (Atlanta-Paris, among others).
Recently, however, carve-outs have emerged as a contentious regulatory issue. In its ten-
tative approval of Star-alliance ATI for Continental (a former SkyTeam member), the DOT
required no new hub-to-hub carve-outs. However, in an advisory opinion, the US Department
of Justice strongly recommended a number of such carve-outs as well as other limitations to
2the scope of ATI, and in its ﬁnal order, the DOT acquiesced in many of the DOJ carve-out
recommendations (see USDOJ (2009) and USDOT (2009)). These carve-outs involved routes
between the New York area and several secondary Star hubs (Stockholm, Zurich, Copenhagen),
and routes between Continental’s hubs and Air Canada’s Toronto hub along with several ad-
ditional Canadian endpoints.
Despite the centrality of carve-outs in this latest ATI decision, the economics literature
on alliances oﬀers no treatment whatsoever of this topic. Since the carve-out issue is likely
to arise in future ATI cases, especially the pending ATI application of American Airlines and
British Airways (AA and BA), this omission requires a remedy. Accordingly, the present paper
develops a theoretical treatment of the carve-out issue using a highly-stylized model based on
the one analyzed by Brueckner (2001).
The model adds a key feature to this earlier analytical framework, which captures an
important new development in the structure of alliances that is germane to the carve-out
issue: the emergence of the “joint venture” as a common alliance form. Under a joint venture
(JV) alliance, the carriers engage in comprehensive revenue sharing on international routes, so
that a partners’ revenue from a passenger is independent of which airline actually provides the
service. This arrangement leads to what is known as a “metal neutral” alliance structure, in
the sense that the identity of the “metal” (the aircraft) involved in the service is irrelevant to
individual airline revenue. Although Northwest and KLM operated a JV alliance starting in
the early 1990s, this form has only recently spread to the other alliances. SkyTeam operates a
JV, and as does the Star alliance (with Continental now participating), and the pending ATI
application of AA and BA also envisions a joint venture.
The paper adopts a particular analytical representation of a joint venture, which aﬀects
the model’s portrayal of hub-to-hub routes. In the absence of a JV, the alliance partners are
assumed to operate separate services on the hub-to-hub route, not capturing the full beneﬁts
of integration. With a JV, however, the hub-to-hub services are consolidated, as under a
true merger. This diﬀerence aﬀects the exploitation of economies of traﬃc density (increasing
returns to scale) on the hub-to-hub route. Economies of density are a hallmark of airline
network models, and their existence implies that cost per passenger falls as the traﬃc volume
3on a route rises, a result of the use of larger, more eﬃcient aircraft and the spreading of
ﬁxed endpoint costs over more passengers. While a non-JV alliance divides hub-to-hub traﬃc
between two separate airline operations, a JV alliance consolidates this traﬃc under a single
uniﬁed entity, achieving(under the model) greater eﬃcienciesfrom higher traﬃc density. Given
the stylized nature of the framework, other eﬃciencies from the JV alliance, including more-
eﬀective scheduling, cannot be captured. For a good discussion of the nature of such additional
beneﬁts, see the response of American Airlines to the criticisms in USDOJ (2009) (American
Airlines (2009)). Such beneﬁts might be capturable in a more-complete model, but at the cost
of much greater complexity.
With this representation of a JV alliance, the trade-oﬀ involved in carve-outs becomes
clear. By preventing collaboration in the hub-to-hub market, a carve-out eliminates a key
element of a JV alliance, consolidation of operations on this route. This loss reduces the
eﬃciency of the alliance, raising cost per passenger on the hub-to-hub route. Oﬀsetting this
downside, however, are potential competitive gains. In particular, eliminating collaboration
in the hub-to-hub market prevents a possible anticompetitive increase in the hub-to-hub fare
under the alliance. Whether the carve-out is harmful or beneﬁcial depends on the net eﬀect
of these two forces. If the eﬃciency loss is substantial relative to any competitive gains, then
the carve-out can be harmful, while a small eﬃciency loss will yield the opposite verdict.
It should be noted that, under the model, the resolution of the carve-out issue involves
considerations that go beyond the market that is directly aﬀected. The reason is that interline
passengers also travel on the hub-to-hub route, and they are aﬀected by the rules governing
this route. Harm from an undesirable hub-to-hub carve-out can extend to these passengers,
while they may also beneﬁt from a desirable carve out.
Another important insight of the analysis is that imposition of a carve-out on a non-JV
alliance has no eﬃciency downside and is thus desirable in the context of the model. In other
words, since non-JV alliance partners do not operate consolidated service on the hub-to-hub
route, banning collaboration on this route generates no eﬃciency loss. However, competitive
beneﬁts emerge, so that the carve-out is in the public interest, leading to a better outcome
than a non-JV alliance without a carve-out.
4It is interesting to note that the DOT’s ﬁnal order in the Continental-Star ATI case is
consistent with this logic. Carve-outs were imposed only on routes that are not part of the
enlarged joint venture. Carve-outs on JV routes were not required, and existing carve-outs on
the routes connecting Chicago and Washington to Frankfurt (which are part of the JV) were
removed.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes the
airlines’ proﬁt maximization problem and develops the equilibrium conditions for four cases: a
JV alliance, a non-JV alliance, an alliance carve-out (where the JV/non-JV distinction ceases
to matter), and the no-alliance case. Section 4 compares the outcomes in the four cases. A
few results analogous to those of Brueckner (2001) are derived for the current model, and the
key conclusions regarding carve-outs, as sketched above, are then proved. Section 5 presents a
numerical example based on speciﬁc functional forms in order to resolve some of the ambiguities
of the theory, and section 6 presents conclusions.
2. The Model
2.1. Network
In order to produce a tractable analysis, the model assumes simpler network and market
structures than in Brueckner (2001). This structure is illustrated in Figure 1. Carrier 1, the
US carrier, operates a route between city A (an interior US endpoint) and city H (its hub and
international gateway). In addition, it operates a route between H and city J in Europe. This
latter city serves as the hub and gateway for carrier 2, the EU carrier. That carrier operates a
route between the two hubs, H and J, while also operating a route between J and the interior
European endpoint B. Carrier 1’s routes are shown as solid lines, while carrier 2’s routes are
shown as dotted lines. Note that carriers 1 and 2 provide overlapping nonstop service between
H and J. Brueckner’s (2001) network structure diﬀers by including two interior endpoints in
each region, each connected to the relevant hub. While this structure would highlight the hub
roles of H and J, it adds nothing essential to the analysis.2
2.2. Travel demands
For simplicity, demand for travel is assumed to exist in only two of the potential city-pair
5markets in Figure 1: markets AB and HJ. Thus, passengers living in city H travel to city J
and back, and passengers living in city J similarly make round trips to city H and back. Such
trips involve nonstop ﬂights, and without loss of generality, passengers are assumed to use
their home airline, so that H residents use airline 1 and J residents use airline 2. Symmetry
is assumed, so that the number of round-trip passengers originating at H equals the number
originating at J. This number is given by the demand function d(phj)/2, where phj is the
common round-trip fare charged in market HJ by the two airlines.3 Total travel demand in
the HJ market (round-trip passengers originating either at H or J) is then double this value,
or d(phj). The inverse demand function is given by D(qhj), where qhj is total round-trip travel
in the market (the sum of originations at H and J).
The second market where travel demand exists is AB. Passengers living in the interior US
city A make round trips to the interior EU city B, while passengers living in city B make round
trips to city A. Since a direct route between A and B does not exist, such a trip involves a
double connection as well as interline travel. Passengers originating in city A ﬂy to hub H on
airline 1, where they change planes and ﬂy onward to the EU hub J, again on airline 1. At
J, the passengers transfer to airline 2 for the ﬁnal leg to city B, retracing their steps on the
journey home. Similarly, AB passengers originating at B ﬂy to J, where they change planes for
the onward trip to H (staying on airline 2). They transfer to airline 1 at H for the ﬁnal leg to
city A, and then retrace their steps to return. Note that, without loss of generality, passengers
in market AB are assumed to stay on their home airline as long as possible. In other words,
A-originating passengers use airline 1 to reach J, when they could actually use airline 2 for the
trip between H and J (similarly for B-originating passengers).
Letting pab denote the fare in market AB, which will be symmetric regardless of origin, the
total travel demand in the market is given by d(pab) (which is the sum of passengers originating
at A and B). The inverse demand is D(qab), where qab is total AB traﬃc. Note that, to ease
the notational burden and without loss of generality, the demand functions are assumed to be
the same in the AB and HJ markets.
Figure 1 includes four additional potential city-pair markets, and travel demand in these
markets is assumed to be zero. The ﬁrst market is AH, which involves travel between the
6interior US endpoint and airline 1’s hub. The second market is AJ, involving travel between A
and the EU hub city J. For simplicity, travel is suppressed in these markets, and demand in the
parallel markets BJ and BH is also assumed to be absent. Brueckner’s (2001) analysis includes
these types of markets, but at the cost of additional algebraic complexity. Since the economic
issues involving alliances and carve-outs arise only in markets HJ and AB, suppression of these
additional markets is warranted.
2.3. Costs
Airline costs, which are symmetric across carriers 1 and 2, consist of the cost of oper-
ating individual route segments, with other potential systemwide costs (ﬁxed or otherwise)
suppressed. The route cost functions exhibit economies of traﬃc density, or increasing returns
to scale (constant returns is considered as a polar case). The economies of operating larger
aircraft, which have a lower cost per seat than smaller aircraft, are well recognized in the litera-
ture, and economies of density can also reﬂect the ﬁxed costs of check-in and baggage-handling
facilities at the endpoints of a route. Accordingly, the cost of carrying T round-trip passengers
on route HJ is given by C(T), where C0 > 0 and C00 ≤ 0. Routes AH and BJ are assumed to
have the same length as route HJ, thus sharing the same cost function. Therefore, the cost of
carrying T round-trip passengers on either of these routes is given by C(T). As in the case of
demands, this common-cost assumption is meant to simplify notation and has little eﬀect on
the results.
A carrier’s total traﬃc T on a route segment depends on city-pair traﬃc. Consider ﬁrst
the “interior” routes AH and BJ. Since each round-trip passenger in the AB market travels on
both the AH and the BJ routes, regardless of whether he/she originates at A or B, airline 1’s
traﬃc on route AH equals qab and airline 2’s traﬃc on route BJ also equals qab. Thus, letting
Ti denote traﬃc on the interior routes AH and BJ, Ti = qab holds, so that each airline incurs
a cost of C(qab) in operating its interior route.
Total traﬃc on the interhub route HJ, by contrast, consists of passengers traveling in
market AB and passengers traveling in the HJ market itself. Thus, total traﬃc on the HJ
route is Thj ≡ qab + qhj. How this passenger volume translates into carrier costs depends on
the degree of integration of the two airlines. In the no-alliance case, carriers 1 and 2 compete
7on the HJ route and thus operate separate ﬂights. Given symmetry, the carriers divide the
total traﬃc equally, each carrying Thj/2 passengers and incurring a cost of C(Thj/2) on the
HJ route.
By contrast, under a joint-venture (JV) alliance, the two airlines will eﬀectively merge
their international services, so that duplicate costs will no longer be incurred. As a result,
the overall cost of operating the HJ route is now given by C(Thj), with each airline’s share
of this total equalling C(Thj)/2. Total traﬃc volume in the HJ route will in general diﬀer
between the no-alliance and JV alliance cases, so that the Thj values in this and the previous
cost expression will not be the same. However, holding Thj ﬁxed, the existence of economies of
density means that C(Thj/2) > C(Thj)/2, so that the JV alliance leads to cost savings when
traﬃc is held constant. The reason is that combined rather than separate operations allow
fuller exploitation of economies of density.
In the non-JV alliance case, by contrast, separate operations are maintained on the HJ
route, just as in the no-alliance case. As a result, each carrier incurs a cost of C(Thj/2) for a
given volume of traﬃc on the HJ route (again, this volume will generally diﬀer from the above
cases).
Depending on the degree of integration, a carve-out can aﬀect an alliance’s cost structure.
In the non-JV alliance case, a carve-out has no cost eﬀect, serving only to preclude collaboration
in the HJ market. However, a carve-out does change the structure of costs for a JV alliance. By
preventing a merger on the HJ route, traﬃc must be divided across separate ﬂight operations,
so that each airline’s cost is C(Thj/2) rather than C(Thj)/2. Thus, under a carve out, JV and
non-JV alliances are rendered equivalent, with separate costs incurred on the HJ route and
collaboration precluded in the HJ market.
3. Proﬁt Maximization and Equilibrium Conditions
3.1. Alliances without carve outs
First consider proﬁt maximization under alliances in the absence of carve-outs. In these
cases, the airlines collaborate in setting fares in both the AB and HJ markets. In the AB
market, the alliance partners determine a fare pab for the entire trip between the A and B
8endpoints, and they split the revenue from the market under a symmetric prorate agreement.
In the HJ market, the airlines determine a common fare that maximizes their individual and
thus combined proﬁts.
Consider ﬁrst the non-JV alliance. For clarity, it is useful to write individual airline proﬁt







phjd(phj) − C[d(pab)] − C[(d(pab) + d(phj))/2]. (1)
Note that each airline earns revenue from two markets (AB and HJ) while incurring costs from
operating two routes, its interior route and the HJ route.








qhjD(qhj) − C(qab) − C[(qab + qhj)/2]. (2)
In this case, the alliance members are portrayed as jointly choosing quantities to maximize
individual proﬁts, with fares given via the inverse demand functions.
Using (2), the ﬁrst-order conditions for choice of qab and qhj are
π
non-jv
ab = D(qab) + qabD0(qab) − 2C0(qab) − C0[(qab + qhj)/2] = 0 (3)
π
non-jv
hj = D(qhj) + qhjD0(qhj) − C0[(qab + qhj)/2] = 0, (4)
where the subscripts on π denote derivatives with respect to qab and qhj. The ﬁrst two terms
in (3) give marginal revenue from a passenger in the AB market while the last two terms give
marginal cost of serving a passenger, which equals marginal cost on two interior routes plus
marginal cost on the interhub HJ route. Similarly, the ﬁrst two terms in (4) give marginal
revenue in the HJ market, while the last term is marginal cost on the single route used in
serving the market.
By contrast, the HJ cost expression diﬀers under a JV alliance in the manner explained







qhjD(qhj) − C(qab) −
1
2
C(qab + qhj). (5)
9The ﬁrst-order conditions analogous to (3) and (4) are
π
jv
ab = D(qab) + qabD0(qab) − 2C0(qab) − C0(qab + qhj) = 0 (6)
π
jv
hj = D(qhj) + qhjD0(qhj) − C0(qab + qhj) = 0. (7)
Note that, because of combined operations on HJ route under the joint venture, marginal cost
is given by C0 evaluated at the total traﬃc level qab + qhj, rather than half that level.
The second-order conditions for the two proﬁt maximization conditions are assumed to
hold. Intuitively, given that both marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) are de-
creasing in quantities, these conditions in part require that MR is decreasing faster than MC.
3.2. Alliances with a carve out
Under a carve-out, the alliance partners must compete in the HJmarket while being allowed
to cooperate in the AB market. As explained above, this competition requirement precludes
joint operations on the HJ route, so that individual airline cost on this route is C[(qab+qhj)/2].
Thus, the eﬀect of the joint venture is eliminated, with the proﬁt expressions being identical
in the two cases.
Since the carriers must compete in the HJ market, they choose individual traﬃc levels in
this market rather than collaborating in setting a common traﬃc level. Let the traﬃc levels
for carriers 1 and 2 be denoted q1
hj and q2
hj, variables that are distinct for purposes of proﬁt
maximization but that will end up being equal in the symmetric equilibrium. Airline 1’s proﬁt







hj) − C(qab) − C(qab/2 + q1
hj), (8)
with a parallel expression applying for airline 2. Note that q1
hj rather than qhj/2 multiplies the
HJ inverse demand (which now depends on the sum of the individual traﬃc levels), and that
the same modiﬁcation appears inside the HJ cost expression.
With Cournot behavior, the ﬁrst-order conditions under a carve-out are found by diﬀeren-
tiating (8) with respect to qab and q1
hj, holding q2
hj ﬁxed. The symmetric equilibrium is then
10determined by setting q1
hj = q2
hj = qhj/2 in these expressions. The resulting conditions are
πcarve
ab = D(qab) + qabD0(qab) − 2C0(qab) − C0[(qab + qhj)/2] = 0 (9)
πcarve
hj = D(qhj) +
1
2
qhjD0(qhj) − C0[(qab + qhj)/2] = 0. (10)
Note that these conditions are the same as (6)–(7) except that 1/2 appears before the second
expression, reﬂecting the fact that MR in the HJ market diﬀers when the carriers compete
instead of collaborating.
3.3. No alliance
In the no-alliance case, the airlines compete in market HJ and also behave in non-coop-
erative fashion in market AB. Following Brueckner (2001), this latter behavior involves the
non-cooperative choice of “subfares,” which represent the individual carrier revenue earned
from interline AB trips.
Each airline determines its AB subfare to maximize proﬁt, taking the other airline’s subfare
as given and recognizing that the overall AB fare equals the sum of the subfares. This subfare
choice involves double marginalization, in that each carrier individually aﬀects the AB fare
via its subfare choice. Let s1
ab denote airline 1’s subfare and s2
ab denote 2’s subfare, with
pab = s1
ab + s2
ab. Note that while airline 1 carries A-originating AB passengers farther than
B-originating AB passengers (on both the AH and HJ routes rather than just the AH route),
the subfare s1
ab can be viewed as the average amount earned from these two types of passengers,
with a similar observation applying to s2
ab and airline 2.4
Given the choice of subfares in market AB, the airline proﬁt expression in the no-alliance
case cannot be written entirely in terms of quantities, as in the previous cases. Proﬁt for airline













The ﬁrst term is revenue from the AB market, equal to the subfare s1
ab times AB traﬃc, which
is given by the direct demand function d(·) evaluated at the overall fare s1
ab+s2
ab. The last cost
expression in (11) contains a term for half of AB traﬃc using this same demand expression.
11The ﬁrst-order condition for q1
hj is computed in the same fashion as in the alliance carve-
out case. Imposing symmetry, the resulting equilibrium condition is the same as (10) (qab/2
replaces d(s1
ab + s2












hj]d0/2 = 0. (12)
To convert (12) into an expression involving quantities comparable to the previous conditions,
the ﬁrst step is to divide by d0/2. Then, recognizing that 1/d0(pab) = D0(qab), that d(pab) = qab,
and ﬁnally that s1
ab = s2
ab = pab/2 holds in the symmetric equilibrium, (12) reduces to
D(qab) + 2qabD0(qab) − 2C0(qab) − C0[(qab + qhj)/2] = 0. (13)
Compared to the non-JV alliance condition (3), double marginalization in the AB market
introduces a factor of 2 prior to the qabD0(qab) term. Given D0 < 0, this modiﬁcation reduces
marginal revenue and tends to lead to a smaller value of qab (and thus a higher overall fare
pab) relative to the alliance case, a result familiar from Brueckner (2001).
3.4. Uniﬁed presentation of equilibrium conditions
Combining the previous results, a uniﬁed presentation of the equilibrium conditions is as
follows:
Ω ≡ D(qab) + αqabD0(qab) − 2C0(qab) − C0[λ(qab + qhj)/2] = 0 (14)
Φ ≡ D(qhj) +
1
β
qhjD0(qhj) − C0[λ(qab + qhj)/2] = 0, (15)
where the parameters α, β, and λ take the following values:
non-JV alliance [(3),(4)] : α = 1, β = 1, λ = 1 (16)
JV alliance [(6),(7)] : α = 1, β = 1, λ = 2 (17)
alliance with carve-out [(9),(10)] : α = 1, β = 2, λ = 1 (18)
no alliance [(13),(10)] : α = 2, β = 2, λ = 1 (19)
124. Comparing the Equilibria
To gauge the eﬀects of the diﬀerent alliance structures, the analysis in this section attempts
to compare equilibrium values of qab and qhj across the various cases shown in (16)–(19), a
comparison that also reveals diﬀerences in fares and (in some instances) consumer welfare
across the cases. Given that the cases are distinguished by diﬀerent values of the parameters
α, β, and λ, this comparison can be carried out via comparative-static analysis showing the
impacts of changes in these parameters. Comparisons across the cases of airline proﬁts and
social welfare are also presented, where possible. Since some key comparisons are ambiguous,
section 5 imposes more structure on the analysis by adopting linear forms for demand and
marginal cost, yielding complete results based on numerical analysis.
The comparative-static results are generated by totally diﬀerentiating the equation system
in (14)–(15). Let the derivatives of the Ω and Φ expressions in these equations be given by
Ωab ≡ ∂Ω/∂qab, Φhj ≡ ∂Φ/∂qhj, and Ωhj ≡ ∂Ω/∂qhj = ∂Φ/∂qab ≡ Φab = −C00[λ(qab +
qhj)/2]λ/2 ≥ 0. Then, for each of the parameter combinations in (16)–(19), the following
conditions are assumed to hold:
Ωab, Φhj < 0; Λ ≡ ΩabΦhj − ΩhjΦab > 0. (20)
For the JV and non-JV alliance cases, (14) and (15) are just the ﬁrst-order conditions for the
respective maximization problems. Thus, the inequalities in (20) give the second-order condi-
tions for these problems, which are assumed to hold. For the carve-out and no-alliance cases,
however, (14)–(15) are not the same as the ﬁrst-order conditions, partly because symmetry
is imposed to get the former conditions. As a result, the inequalities in (20) do not exactly
match the second-order conditions for the carve-out and no-alliance cases. Nevertheless, the
inequalities in (20) are assumed to hold for these cases along with the relevant second-order
conditions.5
The strategy is ﬁrst to mechanically compute the various comparative-static derivatives.
Once all the results have been derived, implications regarding the alliance structures are then
developed. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of a change in α on the equilibrium quantities. Totally



















where Ωα = qabD0(qab) > 0 represents ∂Ω/∂α. To understand the sign of (22), recall Φab ≥ 0,
with equality holding when C00 = 0.



















where Φβ = −qhjD0(qhj)/β2 > 0 represents ∂Φ/∂β. In (23), recall Ωhj ≥ 0, with equality
holding when C00 = 0.
















[(qab + qhj)C00/2](Ωab − Φab)
Λ
≥ 0, (26)
where −(qab + qhj)C00/2 = Ωλ = Φλ ≥ 0.
The results in (21)–(26) can now be used to make comparisons between the cases. The
ﬁrst result is as follows:
Proposition 1.
(i) Suppose that economies of density are present (C00 < 0), and that an alliance carve-
out is not imposed. Then, under both the non-JV and JV alliance cases, the traﬃc levels
qab and qhj bear an ambiguous relationship to traﬃc levels in the no-alliance case.
14(ii) Suppose that economies of density are absent (C00 ≡ 0), and that an alliance carve-
out is not imposed. Then, the non-JV and JV alliance cases are indistinguishable, and
the common traﬃc level qab in these cases is higher than in the no-alliance case, while
the traﬃc level qhj is lower than in the no-alliance case.
Proof: To establish part (i), note ﬁrst from (16)–(19) that moving from the no-alliance case
to the non-JV alliance case involves decreases in both α and β. Next observe from (21)–(24)
that, when C00 > 0, both qab and qhj fall when α declines, while both traﬃc levels rise when
β declines. Therefore, the net change in each traﬃc level is ambiguous. While λ also changes
in moving to the JV alliance case, the previous ambiguity persists because of the ambiguous
net impact of α and β. To establish part (ii), note that, when economies of density are absent
(when C00 = 0), the C0 terms in (14) and (15) are constants, so that the magnitude of λ is
immaterial (the density beneﬁts from the JV alliance then disappear). Next, observe from (21)
and (23) that ∂qab/∂α < 0 and ∂qab/∂β = 0 hold when C00 = 0. Therefore, a joint decrease
in α and β raises qab. Similarly, since ∂qhj/∂α = 0 and ∂qhj/∂β > 0 hold from (22) and (24)
when C00 = 0, a joint decrease in α and β reduces qhj.
Proposition 1 thus shows that, while alliances have ambiguous traﬃc impacts in general,
cooperation in the AB market, and the resulting elimination of double marginalization, un-
ambiguously raises traﬃc and decreases the AB fare when economies of density are absent.
However, anti-competitive cooperation in the HJ market unambiguously reduces traﬃc in this
case, raising the HJ fare. By continuity, both of these conclusions still hold when economies of
density are present but suﬃciently weak. Brueckner (2001) oﬀers results analogous to Propo-
sition 1 for a more complex model.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. C0 is equal to a constant µ, so that
marginal cost in the HJ market is µ while marginal cost in the AB market is 3µ, as indicated
by the horizontal lines in the ﬁgure. Marginal revenue in each market in the alliance case is
given by the middle downward-sloping curve, while MRs in the no-alliance case are given by
the lower curve for the AB market and the upper curve for the HJ market. As can be seen,
movement to the alliance case raises qab and lowers qhj. Also, note that because of the higher
marginal cost of carrying an AB passenger, traﬃc qab is lower than in the HJ market in each
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The next set of results compares the alliance carve-out case to the no-alliance case, as
follows:
Proposition 2. When an alliance carve-out is imposed and economies of density are
present, both qab and qhj are higher than in the no-alliance case. When economies
of density are absent, qab is again higher under an alliance carve-out, while qhj is the
same as in the no-alliance case. In both situations, consumer welfare under the alliance
carve-out is higher than in the no-alliance case.
Proof: From (18) and (19), moving from the no-alliance case to the alliance carve-out case
involves only a decline in α. From (21)–(22), this decline raises both qab and qhj when C00 < 0
while leaving qhj unchanged when C00 = 0. With traﬃc at least as high in both the AB and
HJ markets, consumer welfare is higher than in the no-alliance case.
With a carve-out, movement to an alliance eliminates double marginalization in the AB
market without generating anticompetitive cooperation in the HJ market. The AB traﬃc
boost resulting from this elimination raises traﬃc on the interhub HJ route as well as on
the interior routes. With economies of density, this traﬃc gain on the HJ route lowers the
marginal cost of serving passengers in the HJ market, reducing the HJ fare and increasing qhj.
Thus, cooperation in the AB market generates a positive spillover into the HJ market, and
this spillover is not oﬀset by anti-competitive behavior in that market given the carve-out.
Therefore, beneﬁcial eﬀects in the AB market permeate the entire network. When economies
of density are absent, however, the AB traﬃc boost has no eﬀect on marginal cost on the HJ
route, eliminating the positive spillover.
As before, the conclusions of Proposition 2 can be illustrated in Figure 2 in the absence
of economies of density. With the carve-out, the upper curve continues to represent marginal
revenue in the HJ market even after formation of the alliance, while marginal revenue in the
AB market again shifts from the lower curve to the middle curve. Thus, qab rises under the
carve-out while qhj is unchanged relative to the no-alliance case.
The ﬁnal set of results focuses on the JV alliance:
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(i) With economies of density, a JV alliance leads to higher traﬃc levels qab and qhj
in both markets than a non-JV alliance and thus a higher level of consumer welfare.
(ii) Imposing a carve-out on a non-JV alliance raises traﬃc levels in at least one
market, thus increasing consumer welfare. But, when economies of density are present,
imposing a carve-out on a JV alliance yields ambiguous eﬀects on traﬃc and consumer
welfare.
Proof : Part (i) is established by noting from (16)–(17) that a movement from a non-JV alliance
to a JV alliance involves an increase in λ. From (25)–(26), this increase raises both qab and qhj
when C00 > 0, increasing consumer welfare. Part (ii) is established by observing that imposing
a carve-out on a non-JV alliance involves an increase in β. From (23)–(24), this increase raises
both traﬃc levels when C00 > 0, while leaving qab unchanged when C00 = 0. In either case,
consumer welfare rises. But when a carve-out is imposed on a JV alliance, λ falls while β
rises. Given (23)–(26), these changes move qab and qhj in opposite directions when economies
of density are present. Net changes in traﬃc, and thus the impact on consumer welfare, are
then ambiguous.
Since the JV alliance allows better exploitation of economies of density than a non-JV
alliance with no change in airline behavior, the beneﬁts cited in part (i) of the Proposition
are straightforward. In addition, since imposing a carve-out on a non-JV alliance eliminates
anticompetitive cooperation in the HJ market while involving no sacriﬁce of economies of
density, the beneﬁts of doing so are clear. By contrast, imposing a carve-out on a JV alliance
generates opposing eﬀects. Preventing collaboration in the HJ market generates a competitive
beneﬁt while preventing the JV’s more-eﬀective exploitation of economies of density. As a
result, the net eﬀects on traﬃc levels and consumer welfare are ambiguous. This ﬁnding
recalls the standard conclusion regarding a merger of two ﬁrms producing with increasing
returns. Whether such a merger is beneﬁcial depends on size of the competitive loss relative
to the gains from better exploitation of scale economies.
Since economies of density are present, making marginal cost non-constant, Figure 2 cannot
be used to illustrate Proposition 3 in a rigorous fashion. However, a few suggestive observations
can be made. First, with a JV alliance leading to lower costs, both the horizontal cost lines
17in the ﬁgure will shift down relative to the non-JV case, raising alliance traﬃc levels and
illustrating the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Note, however, that the extent of this downward
cost shift is endogenous since it depends on the traﬃc levelsthemselves. To illustrate the second
part of the proposition, Figure 2 can be viewed as illustrating the initial JV case. Then, a
carve-out will tend to raise the height of the cost lines, while at the same time raising marginal
revenue in the HJ market from the middle to the upper curve. From the ﬁgure, it can be seen
that these combined shifts produce an ambiguous eﬀect on qhj. However, since the cost-line
heights are themselves endogenous, the ﬁgure cannot rigorously illustrate the outcome.
The results in Propositions 1–3 lead to a partial ranking of the four cases under considera-
tion from the consumer’s point of view. The three alliance cases can be ranked in either of two
orders: alliance carve-out/JV alliance/non-JV alliance or JV alliance/alliance carve-out/non-
JV alliance. The no-alliance case is ranked below a carve-out, but otherwise it can appear
anywhere in these lists.
The cases can also be ranked from the perspective of airline proﬁts. Since both the JV and
non-JV alliances involve full coordination between the carriers, while costs are lower under the
JV alliance due to consolidated operations, aggregate proﬁt is higher in the JV case. Moreover,
since movement from the no-alliance case to a non-JV alliance involves coordination in both
markets and no change in costs, the non-JV alliance is more proﬁtable (implying that a JV
alliance is also superior to no alliance). In addition, since movement from the alliance carve-
out case to a non-JV alliance involves the introduction of coordination in the one market
where it is missing, proﬁt grows (implying that a JV alliance is also more proﬁtable than
a carve-out). However, the proﬁt diﬀererence between the no-alliance and carve-out cases is
ambiguous. Coordination in the AB market under the carve-out tends to raise proﬁt, but since
cooperation is absent in the HJ market, this tendency does not necessarily raise the combined
proﬁt of the carriers. Thus, the proﬁt ranking of the cases is JV alliance/non-JV alliance/no
alliance, with a carve ranked either third or fourth.
With both proﬁt and consumer welfare higher under a JV alliance than a non-JV alliance,
social welfare is higher in the JV case. However, welfare comparisons among the other cases
are ambiguous in general. To carry out such comparisons, and to dispel other ambiguities of
18the general model, the next section imposes linear functional forms for demand and marginal
cost while assuming that consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer welfare (requiring
the absence of income eﬀects on demand).6
5. Numerical Example
5.1. The setup
The analysis of section 4 leaves some key ambiguities: whether imposing a carve-out on a
JV alliance is beneﬁcial for consumers; whether either type of alliance is better for consumers
than the no-alliance case; how the cases rank in terms of social welfare. These ambiguities
can only be resolved by imposing more structure on the model, and the purpose of the present
section is to do so by assuming linear forms for the demand and marginal-cost functions,
following similar numerical analysis in Brueckner (2001). Thus, the demand function is given
by D(q) = γ − q/2 and the marginal-cost function by C0(T) = 1 − θT. Observe that this
marginal-cost function is downward sloping, indicating economies of density. Note also that,
for simplicity, the demand slope and marginal-cost intercept are both normalized, leaving a
two-dimensional (γ,θ) parameter space.7
The ﬁrst step is to derive the feasible region in this parameter space, where several restric-
tions are satisﬁed. Under each of the cases, three requirements must be met: the conditions in
(20) must hold; the traﬃc levels qab and qhj must be positive; marginal costs on the two route
segments operated by each carrier must be positive (given the form of C0(T), negative values
are possible for large traﬃc levels). While these requirements generate a feasible (γ,θ) region
for each of the four cases (JV alliance, non-JV alliance, etc.), the intersection of these four
regions is the relevant feasible region for the analysis. In this region, the three requirements
are met for all the cases.
The conditions in (20) for each case imply an upper bound on θ, and the most stringent
of these restrictions is θ ≤ 0.19. To understand the restrictions implied by the nonnegativity
requirements, consider a simple setting where an increasing-returns-to-scale monopolist serves
a single market, and suppose that the linear demand and marginal-cost curves from above
are relevant. The equilibrium is given by the intersection of downward-sloping MC and MR
19curves, with the latter being steeper. In order for this intersection to occur above the quantity
axis, yielding positive MC and MR values, the MC slope parameter θ cannot be too large
relative to the MR intercept parameter γ. Conversely, to generate a positive quantity, γ
cannot be smaller than the MC intercept. While the present context is more complex, similar
restrictions emerge, yielding the feasible region shown in Figure 3. The region’s curved right
border corresponds to the positive-MC restriction, which is tightest for the JV alliance case,
and the nearly vertical left border corresponds to the positive-quantity restriction, which is
tightest for the non-JV alliance case.8
The numerical analysis carries out pairwise comparisons between each of the four cases
(e.g., JV vs. non-JV alliance), comparing traﬃc levels, consumer surplus, proﬁt, and social
welfare (consumer surplus plus proﬁt) between the cases throughout the feasible region. When
the comparisons yield complex patterns, the results are illustrated graphically.
5.2. Basic ﬁndings
JV vs. non-JV alliance: Proposition 3(i) indicates that traﬃc levels in both markets are
higher under the JV alliance than under the non-JV alliance, and this ﬁnding is conﬁrmed
numerically. In addition, the computations show that consumer surplus, proﬁt and social
welfare are all higher under a JV alliance throughout the feasible region, as expected.
Carve-out vs. non-JV alliance: Proposition 3(ii) indicates that traﬃc levels are higher in
both markets under a carve-out than under a non-JV alliance, and this ﬁnding is conﬁrmed
numerically. Consumer surplus is then higher and proﬁt lower under the carve-out, as expected.
The results show that the former eﬀect dominates, so that social welfare is higher throughout
the feasible region under a carve-out than under a non-JV alliance.
Carve-out vs. no alliance: Proposition 2 indicates that traﬃc levels in both markets are
higher under a carve-out than with no alliance, and this ﬁnding is conﬁrmed numerically.
Consumer surplus is thus higher under the carve-out as expected, but proﬁt is lower over a
narrow vertical strip at the upper left edge of the feasible region, though larger otherwise.
The surplus eﬀect dominates, so that welfare is higher under a carve-out than with no alliance
throughout the feasible region.
While the above ﬁndings are mostly predicted by the propositions, the following compar-
20isons resolve some key questions left ambiguous by the theory.
Non-JV alliance vs. no alliance: While Proposition 1 indicates that this comparison is am-
biguous in general, the numerical results show that qab is higher under a non-JV alliance than
with no alliance, and that qhj is lower, relationships that hold throughout the feasible region.
Note that these relationships match those emerging in the absence of economies of density (see
Proposition 1). Since the consumer surplus gain in the AB market is smaller than the loss
in the HJ market, overall surplus is lower under the alliance throughout the feasible region,
while proﬁt is higher (as expected). Because of these opposing changes, the welfare comparison
depends on parameter values, as seen in Figure 4. Welfare under the alliance is higher in the
white part of the feasible region but lower in the grey portion, where the demand intercept γ
takes small values. Thus, relative to no alliance, a non-JV alliance is welfare enhancing unless
travel demand is low.
JV alliance vs. no alliance: This comparison is again ambiguous in general, but the nu-
merical results again show that qab is higher (and qhj lower) under the alliance throughout
the feasible region. Although consumer surplus is lower under the JV alliance over nearly all
the feasible region, this relationship is reversed in the sliver of white area shown in Figure 5,
where θ is large and demand is as large as possible for the given θ range. Thus, an increase
in consumer surplus is possible under the JV alliance when economies of density are strong,
reinforcing the increase in proﬁt. This more favorable picture, which is a result of the gains
from consolidated JV operations, leads to a better welfare comparison than under the non-JV
alliance. Relative to the no-alliance case, the JV alliance leads to higher welfare over a greater
portion of the feasible region, as seen in Figure 6 (the white area is larger than in Figure 4).
Carve-out vs. JV alliance: The general ambiguity in this comparison is also resolved by
the numerical results. In contrast to the non-JV vs. carve-out comparison, qab is lower under
the carve-out than under the JV alliance throughout the feasible region, while qhj is again
higher under the carve-out. A lower qab emerges because the loss of beneﬁts from consolidated
operations caused by the carve-out raises marginal cost on the HJ route even though the
increase in qhj tends to reduce MC via economies of density. This increase in MC depresses
AB traﬃc even though cooperation in market AB is unchanged in moving from the alliance
21to the carve-out. Note that the increase qhj occurs despite the higher marginal cost on the
HJ route, being a consequence of the elimination of anticompetitive HJ cooperation under the
carve-out.
Appraising the net eﬀect of these traﬃc changes, the carve-out raises consumer surplus
throughout the feasible region while reducing proﬁt. The welfare comparison is shown in
Figure 7, with welfare under carve-out higher than under the JV alliance in the grey area and
lower in the white area. Thus, imposing a carve-out on a JV alliance is usually desirable but is
welfare reducing when θ is large and demand is at the high end of the feasible region over this
θ range. This conclusion makes intuitive sense given that imposition of a carve-out requires
sacriﬁcing the beneﬁts from consolidated operations, which are greatest when θ is large and
economies of density are strong.
Another observation, which comes from comparing Figures 6 and 7, is that the region
where a JV alliance is superior to a carve-out in Figure 7 is contained within the region in
Figure 6 where the JV alliance is superior to no alliance. Therefore, a JV-alliance is better
than a carve-out only when the alliance is itself preferred to no alliance.
The main lessons of the numerical analysis are summarized as follows:
Proposition 4.
(i) JV and non-JV alliances lead to higher social welfare than the no-alliance case
unless travel demand is low, in a sense made precise in Figures 4 and 6.
(ii) An alliance carve-out leads to higher social welfare than both the no-alliance and
JV-alliance cases.
(iii) Imposing a carve-out on a JV alliance reduces social welfare when economies of
density are strong, in a sense made precise in Figure 7, raising welfare otherwise.
Note that part (ii) of the proposition mirrors the general conclusions regarding a carve-out’s
impact on consumer, as opposed to social, welfare (Propositions 2, 3(ii)).
5.3. The eﬀect of a larger AB market
Given that alliances are designed to beneﬁt interline passengers, it is useful to explore the
eﬀect of increasing the size of AB market, where interline travel is required, relative to the HJ
22market’s size. This change is realistic since, for most alliances, hub-to-hub markets are small
relative to the collection of interline markets they serve. Accordingly, the numerical analysis is
redone under the assumption that the demand intercept in the AB market is 3γ, with the HJ
intercept remaining at γ. This change leads to a smaller feasible region, whose upper boundary
at any given γ is closer to the horizontal axis.9
With a larger AB market, the JV alliance is preferred to no alliance over a larger share of
the feasible region, as seen in Figure 8. As before, the JV alliance leads to lower welfare when
demand is low, but this (grey) region is relatively small, as seen in the ﬁgure. This typically
positive welfare outcome partly reﬂects the JV alliance’s better performance in generating
consumer surplus. As seen in Figure 9, the white area where surplus is higher under the
alliance grows from the small sliver in Figure 5 to an area that comprises most of the feasible
region. This change makes sense given that the interline passengers, who beneﬁt from the
alliance, are now relatively larger in number. Similar conclusions apply to the comparison
between a non-JV alliance and no alliance, which yields diagrams similar to Figures 8 and 9.
Another interesting impact of the larger AB market is seen in Figure 10, which compares
the level of qhj between the JV and no-alliance cases. Within the small white area in the ﬁgure,
traﬃc in market HJ is higher under the alliance despite the restraining eﬀect of cooperative
pricing in that market. This outcome derives partly from the gain due to consolidated oper-
ations under the alliance, but it also reﬂects the greater weight of the increase in AB traﬃc,
which serves to further push down marginal cost on the HJ route and to oﬀset the eﬀect of
anticompetitive pricing.10
Finally, Figure 11 compares welfare in the JV alliance and carve-out cases. The white area,
where imposing a carve-out on a JV alliance reduces welfare, now comprises a larger portion
of the feasible region.11 Thus, a carve-out is more likely to be undesirable when the interline
markets are large relative to the hub-to-hub market.
5.4. Recommendations for regulators
When presented with an alliance’s application for antitrust immunity, regulators must
decide whether to approve the application outright, deny it, or to require modiﬁcations. Based
on the preceding numerical analysis, the proper course can be identiﬁed. If the ATI application
23involves a non-JV alliance, then regulators should approve the application subject to a carve-
out. This conclusion follows from Proposition 4(ii), which indicates higher welfare under a
carve-out than under both the non-JV alliance (the outcome under full approval of the ATI
application) and the no-alliance case (the outcome under denial of the application).
Whether the airlines accept the regulator’s oﬀer of a carve-out depends on proﬁts relative
to the no-alliance case, their fall-back position. While carve-out proﬁt is always higher when
the AB market is large, carve-out proﬁt is lower than in the no-alliance case over a small part
of the feasible region when the AB and HJ markets have the same size, as mentioned above.
If the (γ,θ) parameters lie in this small region, then the airlines will reject the carve-out oﬀer,
choosing not to pursue their alliance, but they will accept it otherwise.
If the ATI application involves a JV alliance, then by Proposition 4(iii), the regulators
should grant full approval if the parameters lie in the white region in Figure 7 or Figure
11. Since this region is larger in Figure 11, the regulators should more readily grant full
ATI approval when the interline markets served by the alliance are large in total relative to
the hub-to-hub market (or conversely, when the hub-to-hub market is small). Otherwise, the
application should be approved subject to a carve-out. As in the non-JV case, denial of the ATI
application is never warranted given that a carve-out yields higher welfare than no alliance.
As before, the airlines may again choose not to accept a carve-out oﬀer for some parameter
values.12
6. Conclusion
This paper has oﬀered the ﬁrst formal economic analysis of carve-outs under airline an-
titrust immunity. Carve-outs are designed to limit the potential anticompetitive eﬀects of
cooperation by alliance partners in hub-to-hub markets, where they provide overlapping non-
stop service. While the paper shows that carve-outs are beneﬁcial when the alliance does not
involve full integration of the partners’ operations on the hub-to-hub route, its key point is
that a carve-out may be harmful when imposed on a joint-venture alliance. A JV alliance in-
volves full exploitation of economies of traﬃc density on the hub-to-hub route (as well as other
synergies not captured by the model), and a carve-out prevents the realization of these bene-
24ﬁts. While a carve-out may limit anticompetitive incentives on the hub-to-hub route, welfare
may be reduced if the resulting gains are overshadowed by the eﬃciency loss generated by the
carve-out, an outcome that arises in the model when economies of traﬃc density are strong.
This argument, which has been made by the airlines themselves, ﬁnds its ﬁrst formalization in
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Figure 3: Feasible region









Figure 4: Welfare diﬀerence, non-JV alliance vs. no alliance









Figure 5: Consumer-surplus diﬀerence, JV alliance vs. no alliance
(white +, grey −)









Figure 6: Welfare diﬀerence, JV alliance vs. no alliance









Figure 7: Welfare diﬀerence, JV alliance vs. carve-out
(white +, grey −)









Figure 8: Welfare diﬀerence, JV alliance vs. no alliance with large AB market









Figure 9: Consumer-surplus diﬀerence, JV alliance vs. no alliance with large
AB market
(white +, grey −)









Figure 10: HJ traﬃc diﬀerence, JV alliance vs. no alliance with large
AB market









Figure 11: Welfare diﬀerence, JV alliance vs. carve-out with large AB market
(white +, grey −)References
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28Footnotes
∗We thank Ricardo Flores-Fillol for comments. Errors, however, are our responsibility.
1See Barla and Constantatos (2004), Bilotkach (2005, 2007), Chen and Gayle (2007), Flores-
Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007), Hassin and Shy (2004), Oum, Park and Zhang (1996),
Oum, Yu and Zhang (2001), Park (1997), Park, Park and Zhang (2003), Park and Zhang
(1998, 2000) and Park, Zhang and Zhang (2001). See Bamberger, Carlton and Newman
(2004), Ito and Lee (2007), and Gayle (2007, 2008) for studies of domestic airline alliances.
2Like the rest of the alliance literature, the model treats the number of potential alliance
partners as ﬁxed, abstracting from entry and exit. Conceivably, higher proﬁts due to alliance
formation could prompt the entry of new carriers also seeking to form immunized alliances.
However, exploration of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of the paper but could be a
subject for future research.
3Note that the ordering of the city names in HJ is simply alphabetical, not signifying direc-
tionality. This market could equally well be denoted JH.
4For AB passengers originating at A, airline 1 would receive a subfare for carrying the pas-
senger over two route segments (AH and HJ), while airline 2 would receive a smaller subfare
for carrying the passenger over a single route segment (BJ). For AB passengers originating
at B, the reverse statement would apply, with airline 2 receiving a large and 1 a small sub-
fare. The subfare s1
ab from above can be viewed as the average of airline 1’s large and small
subfares for these two types of trips, and similarly for s2
ab and airline 2. See the appendix
to Brueckner (2001) for formal discussion of this point in a more-complex model.
5It can be shown that satisfaction of Ωab, Φhj < 0 implies satisfaction of the corresponding
inequalities in the carve-out second-order conditions. However, a similar connection cannot
be established for the no-alliance case. As for the other inequality in (20), ΩabΦhj−ΩhjΦab >
0, this condition can be imposed if stability of the carve-out and no-alliance equilibria is
required. It should be noted that, when demand and marginal cost are linear, as in the
numerical analysis presented below, satisfaction of the conditions in (20) ensures satisfaction
of the second-order conditions for all four cases in (16)–(19).
6The model could be modiﬁed to assume that economies of density are eventually exhausted,
with MC becoming constant at a value m above some threshold level of T. Then, three
types of regimes could be distinguished: (a) all the alliance cases have MC = m, so that
Propositions 1(ii) and 3(ii) hold; (b) all cases have MC > m, so that all the existing results
apply; (c) some cases have MC = m and some have MC > m. Under regime (c), the
29JV alliance case would be the one most likely to achieve MC = m, limiting its welfare
advantage.
7Note that one normalization can be made by appropriate choice of units but that the second
one is arbitrary.
8Since it can be shown that qab < qhj holds under each case, the nonnegativity restriction on
qab need only be considered. That restriction reduces to θ ≥ 3 − γ. In addition, given that
traﬃc on the AB route is then smaller than on the HJ route, the positive MC condition
need only be considered for the HJ route.
9Identiﬁcation of this region is more complicated than before since the market with the
smallest traﬃc level or smallest MC is no longer clear a priori (see footnote 9).
10A similar area is not present in the corresponding ﬁgure for the comparison of the non-JV
and no-alliance cases, a consequence of the absence of consolidation gains.
11The carve-out now reduces consumer surplus as well over a region similar in appearance to
the white region in Figure 7.
12When the AB and HJ markets are of equal size, the area where carve-out proﬁt is lower
than no-alliance proﬁt extends slightly into the area in Figure 7 where a carve-out would be
oﬀered. However, with a larger AB market, a carve-out oﬀer is never rejected.
30